Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union

Neil Brenner

Summary. In the rapidly growing literatures on globalisation, many authors have emphasised the apparent disembedding of social relations from their local-territorial pre-conditions. However, such arguments neglect the relatively fixed and immobile forms of territorial organisation upon which the current round of globalisation is premised, such as urban-regional agglomerations and territorial states. This article argues that processes of reterritorialisation—the reconfiguration and re-scaling of forms of territorial organisation such as cities and states—constitute an intrinsic moment of the current round of globalisation. Globalisation is conceived here as a reterritorialisation of both socioeconomic and political-institutional spaces that unfolds simultaneously upon multiple, superimposed geographical scales. The territorial organisation of contemporary urban spaces and state institutions must be viewed at once as a presupposition, a medium and an outcome of this highly conflictual dynamics of global spatial restructuring. On this basis, various dimensions of urban governance in contemporary Europe are analysed as expressions of a politics of scale that is emerging at the geographical interface between processes of urban restructuring and state territorial restructuring.

1. Introduction

In the rapidly growing literatures on globalisation, many authors have emphasised the apparent disembedding of social, economic and political relations from their local-territorial preconditions. It is argued, for instance, that the ‘space of flows’ is superseding the ‘space of places’ (Castells, 1989, 1996); that territoriality and even geography itself are being dissolved (Ruggie, 1993; O’Brien, 1992); that national borders have become irrelevant, redundant or obsolete (Ohmae, 1995); that nationally organised politico-cultural identities are being ‘deteritorialised’ (Appadurai, 1996); and that ‘supraregional’ spaces based upon ‘distanceless, borderless interactions’ (Scholte, 1996) are decentralising the role of territorial and place-based socio-institutional forms. Whatever their differences of emphasis, research object and interpretation, common to these diverse analyses of globalisation is a focus on the accelerated circulation of people, commodities, capital, money, identities and images through global space. These accelerated, globally circulating flows are said to embody processes of deterritorialisation through which social relations are being increasingly detached and disembedded from places.
Two significant deficiencies characterise interpretations of globalisation that focus one-sidedly upon flows, circulation and processes of detrertorialisation. First, such analyses tend to neglect the forms of relatively fixed and immobile territorial organisation—in particular, urban-regional agglomerations and state regulatory institutions—that enable such accelerated movement. Secondly, and most crucially, such analyses neglect the ways in which the current round of neo-liberal globalisation has been intrinsically dependent upon, intertwined with and expressed through major transformations of territorial organisation on multiple geographical scales. Building upon these criticisms, the central thesis of this article is that processes of reterritorialisation—the reconfiguration and re-scaling of forms of territorial organisation such as cities and states—must be viewed as an intrinsic moment of the current round of globalisation.

Drawing upon the work of David Harvey (1982) and Henri Lefebvre (1977, 1978, 1991), this argument is elaborated through a discussion of various ways in which contemporary cities and states are currently being reterritorialised and re-scaled. Globalisation is conceived here as a reterritorialisation of both socioeconomic and political-institutional spaces that unfolds simultaneously upon multiple, superimposed geographical scales. The territorial organisation of contemporary urban spaces and state institutions must be viewed at once as a presupposition, a medium and an outcome of this highly conflictual dynamic of global spatial restructuring. On this basis, various dimensions of urban governance in contemporary Europe are analysed as expressions of a ‘politics of scale’ (Smith, 1993) that is emerging at the geographical interface between processes of urban restructuring and state territorial restructuring. A brief conclusion proposes that new representations of the ‘scaling’ of spatial practices are needed to grasp the rapidly changing territorial organisation of world capitalism in the late 20th century.

2. Cities, States and the Historical Geography of Capitalism

Fernand Braudel’s famous historical study of early modern Europe, The Perspective of the World (1984), outlines the essential role of cities and states within capitalism’s long-run historical geography. Braudel’s work traces the epochal shift from the ‘city-centred economies’ (Stadtwirtschaft) of Genoa, Venice, Antwerp and Amsterdam to the British ‘territorial economy’ (Territorialwirtschaft), based upon an integrated national market clustered around London, during the 18th century. Following the early modern period, the territorial economies of nation-states largely subsumed the geographies of cities and urbanisation. As cities were subordinated to the political power of states, they were integrated ever more tightly into nationally scaled regimes of accumulation (Arrighi, 1994; Tilley, 1990). In the wake of the second industrial revolution of the late 19th century, the cities of the older industrialised world became engines of Fordist mass production, the urban infrastructure of a global system compartmentalised into distinct territorial states under the geopolitical and geoeconomic hegemony of the US (Altman, 1992; Scott and Storper, 1992). Though transnational inter-urban linkages were crucial to North Atlantic Fordism, a relatively tight fit was established between urban dynamism and national economic growth (Sassen, 1991).

It is this state-centric configuration of world capitalism, premised upon a spatially isomorphic relationship between capital accumulation, urbanisation and state regulation, that has been unravelling since the global economic crises of the early 1970s. Under these circumstances, as Taylor (1995) argues, the historically entrenched relationship of ‘mutuality’ between cities and territorial states is being significantly eroded, leading to new geographies of global urbanisation and capital accumulation that no longer overlap evenly with the geographies of state territorial power. On supranational spatial scales, new macro-geographies of
capital accumulation have been consolidating as Fordist-Keynesian national economies are superseded by a configuration of the world economy dominated by the super-regional blocs of Europe, North America and East Asia (Altvater and Mahnkopf, 1996). On sub-national spatial scales, interspatial competition has intensified among urban regions struggling to attract both capital investment and state subsidies (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998; Krätke, 1991; Mayer, 1992; Swyngedouw, 1989). Meanwhile, new worldwide urban hierarchies have also begun to crystallise, dominated by global cities such as New York, London and Tokyo, in which the major headquarter functions of transnational capital have been increasingly centralised (Hitz et al. 1995; Knox and Taylor, 1995; Sassen, 1991). Finally, particularly since the 1980s, states throughout the world economy have been struggling to restructure themselves at once to adjust to intensified global economic interdependencies and to promote capital investment and renewed accumulation within their territorial boundaries (Cerny, 1995; Hirsch, 1995; Jessop, 1993, 1994; Röttger, 1997).

Braudel’s studies of early modern Europe focus more directly on the historical transition from a city-centric to a state-centric configuration of world capitalism than on the changing relations between cities and states as intertwined modes of socioeconomic, political and geographical organisation. However, the preceding considerations indicate that contemporary cities and states operate not as mutually exclusive or competing geographical configurations for capitalist development, but rather as densely superimposed, interdependent forms of territorial organisation. Cities and states are being reconfigured, reterritorialised and re-scaled in conjunction with the most recent round of capitalist globalisation, but both remain essential forms of territorial organisation upon which the world-scale circulation of capital is premised. This paper analyses these macro-geographical transformations of cities and states as intrinsically related moments within a single dynamic of global capitalist restructuring. To this end, the next section examines more closely the role of cities and territorial states as geographical frameworks within, upon and through which capitalist development unfolds.

3. Cities and States as Forms of Territorial Organisation

The starting-point for this analysis is the endemic problem of territorial organisation under capitalism, as theorised by David Harvey (1982) and Henri Lefebvre (1978, 1991). As Harvey has argued at length, capital is inherently oriented towards the elimination of spatial barriers to its circulation process, the “annihilation of space through time” in Marx’s (1973 [1857], p. 539) famous formulation in the Grundrisse. Harvey’s crucial insight is that this drive towards the continual temporal acceleration of capital circulation, or ‘time-space compression’, has been premised upon the production of space and spatial configuration. It is only through the construction of relatively fixed and immobile transport, communications and regulatory-institutional infrastructures—a ‘second nature’ of socially produced configurations of territorial organisation—that this accelerated physical movement of commodities through space can be achieved. Therefore, as Harvey (1985, p. 145) notes, “spatial organisation is necessary to overcome space”. Harvey introduces the notion of the ‘spatial fix’ to theorise these complex matrices of socially produced spatial configuration and their corresponding temporal dimension, embodied in the socially average turnover time of capital at a given historical conjuncture. A spatial fix, Harvey (1982, p. 416) argues, is secured through the construction of immobile socio-territorial configurations within which expanded capital accumulation can be generated; it entails “the conversion of temporal into spatial restraints to accumulation”.

The role of cities as forms of territorialisation for capital has been widely recognised. Cities territorialise capital through their agglomeration of relatively fixed and immobile infrastructures such as transport
systems, energy supplies, communications networks and other externalities that underpin historically specific forms of production, exchange, distribution and consumption (Gottdiener, 1985; Harvey, 1982, 1989b; Krätke, 1995; Scott, 1988a; Storper and Walker, 1989). The role of territorial states as forms of territorialisation for capital has been analysed less frequently. However, as Lefebvre has argued at length in his neglected four-volume work *De l’État* (1976–78), states have likewise operated as crucial geographical infrastructures through which the circulation of capital has been continually territorialised, deterritorialised and reterritorialised, above all since the second industrial revolution of the late 19th century. According to Lefebvre, the territorial fixity of state institutions provides a stabilised geographical scaffolding for the circulation of labour-power, commodities and capital on multiple scales. States achieve this provisional territorialisation of capital in various ways—for example, through the regulation of money, legal codes, social welfare provisions and, most crucially, by producing large-scale spatial configurations that serve as territorially specific forces of production. As Lefebvre (1978, p. 298) notes, “Only the state can take on the task of managing space ‘on a grand scale’”. Lefebvre’s (1978, pp. 278–280, 307, 388) more general claim in his writings on state theory is that territorial states play crucial roles in moulding the social relations of capitalism into relatively stable geographical-organisational configurations associated with distinct historical patterns of capital accumulation and urbanisation.¹

Lefebvre’s work suggests that each urbanised spatial fix for capital necessarily presupposes a broader *scalar fix* (Smith, 1995) composed of distinctive forms of territorial organisation—including urban-regional agglomerations, state institutions and the world economy—that encompass yet transcend the urban scale. This mode of analysis enables Lefebvre to view spatial scales as a socially produced geographical scaffolding upon, within and through which differential forms of capital are successively de- and reterritorialised during the course of capitalist development (Brenner, 1998b). This conceptualisation of the scalar fix also has substantial implications for the analysis of the changing relations among cities and states in contemporary capitalism. On the one hand, it can be argued that the contradictory dynamic of de- and reterritorialisation is endemic to capitalism as an historical-geographical system, and that it has underpinned each wave of crisis-induced restructuring that has unfolded since the first industrial revolution of the mid 19th century (Mandel, 1975; Soja, 1985). In each case, capital’s restless transformative dynamic renders its own historically specific geographical preconditions obsolete, inducing a wave of restructuring to reterritorialise and thereby reactivate the circulation process. On the other hand, this recurrent dynamic of de- and reterritorialisation has been organised through a wide range of scalar configurations, each produced through the intermeshing of urban networks and state territorial structures that together constitute a relatively fixed geographical infrastructure for each historical round of capitalist expansion. Therefore, as capital is restructured during periods of sustained economic crisis, the scale-configurations upon which it is grounded are likewise reorganised to create a new geographical scaffolding for a new wave of capitalist growth.

Until the early 1970s, these processes of de- and reterritorialisation occurred primarily *within* the geographical scaffolding of state territoriality. Despite the explosive tensions and conflicts induced by both interstate and intercapitalist competition, the modern interstate system has provided capital with a relatively stabilised territorial framework for economic growth and geographical expansion since the 17th century (Arrighi, 1994; Taylor, 1993). In this sense, state territoriality has generally operated as an institutional *platform* for capitalist restructuring rather than as its direct *object*. During the 20th century, under the global political and economic hegemony of the US, the role of the
national scale as a container for both capital accumulation and urbanisation was intensified to such a degree that its historicity as a scale-level was frequently naturalised or misrecognised (Taylor, 1996). However, it will be argued here that one of the most important geographical consequences of the post-1970s round of capitalist globalisation has been to decentre the national scale of accumulation, urbanisation and state regulation in favour of new sub- and supranational territorial configurations.

4. ‘Glocalisation’: The Denationalisation of Territoriality

For present purposes, the term globalisation refers to a double-edged, dialectical process through which: the movement of commodities, capital, money, people and information through geographical space is continually expanded and accelerated; and, relatively fixed and immobile spatial infrastructures are produced, reconfigured and/or transformed to enable such expanded, accelerated movement. From this perspective, globalisation entails a dialectical interplay between the endemic drive towards time-space compression under capitalism (the moment of *determinationalisation*) and the continual production and reconfiguration of relatively fixed spatial configurations—for example, the territorial infrastructures of urban-regional agglomerations and states (the moment of *reterritorialisation*) (Harvey, 1989a, 1996; Lefebvre, 1977, 1978, 1991). Thus defined, globalisation does not occur merely through the geographical extension of capitalism to encompass progressively larger zones of the globe, but emerges only when the expansion and acceleration of capital accumulation becomes intrinsically premised upon the construction of large-scale territorial infrastructures, a ‘second nature’ of socially produced spatial configurations such as railways, highways, ports, canals, airports, informational networks and state institutions that enable capital to circulate at ever-faster turnover times.

Lefebvre (1977, 1978, 1991, p. 37) locates this epochal transformation “from the production of things in space to the production of space” during the late 19th century in which ‘neo-capitalism’ and the ‘state mode of production’ (*le mode de production étatique*) were first consolidated on a world scale. Lash and Urry (1987) have described this state-centric configuration of world capitalist development as ‘organised capitalism’ and—along with many other researchers (see, for example, Arrighi, 1994; Lipietz, 1987; Jessop, 1994; Scott and Storper, 1992)—interpreted the global economic crises of the early 1970s at once as a medium and a consequence of its unravelling. I view the most recent, post-1970s round of world-scale capitalist restructuring as a second major wave of capitalist globalisation through which global socioeconomic interdependencies are being simultaneously intensified, deepened and expanded in close conjunction with the production, reconfiguration and transformation of territorial organisation at once on urban-regional, national and supranational spatial scales. Whereas the late 19th century wave of capitalist globalisation occurred largely within the framework of nationally organised state territorialities, the post-1970s wave of globalisation has significantly decentred the role of the national scale as a self-enclosed container of socioeconomic relations while simultaneously intensifying the importance of both sub- and supranational forms of territorial organisation. This ongoing re-scaling of territoriality can be viewed as the *differentia specifica* of the currently unfolding reconfiguration of world capitalism (Brenner, 1998c).

Thus conceived, the moment of territorialisation remains as fundamental as ever to the process of capital circulation in the contemporary era. However, the scales on which this territorialisation process occurs are no longer spatially co-extensive with the nationally organised matrices of state territoriality that have long defined capitalism’s geopolitical and geoeconomic geographies. In this sense, the current round of globalisation has reconfigured the *scalar* organisation of capital’s endemic dynamic of de- and reterri-
torialisation, triggering what Jessop (1998, p. 90) has aptly termed a “relativisation of scale”:

[1]n contrast to the privileging of the national economy and the national state in the period of Atlantic Fordism, no spatial scale is currently privileged

The concept of ‘glocalisation’, introduced by Swyngedouw (1997, 1992, p. 61) to indicate “the combined process of globalization and local-territorial reconfiguration”, likewise usefully highlights this ongoing, highly conflictual restructuring, interweaving and redifferentiation of spatial scales. The remainder of this paper concretises this conception of globalisation/reterritorialisation by examining various ways in which cities and territorial states are currently being re-scaled in relation to capital’s increasingly ‘glocal’ geographies.

5. Re-scaling Cities

One way to interpret the proliferation of research on world city formation since the publication of Friedmann and Wolff’s (1982) classic paper is as a sustained effort to analyse the ways in which the recent consolidation of a new international division of labour has been intertwined with a concomitant reterritorialisation of urbanisation on differential spatial scales (Hitz et al., 1995; Knox and Taylor, 1995). Whereas some world cities researchers have conceived world cities as a distinctive class of cities at the apex of world-scale central place hierarchies, I view the analytical framework of world city theory more broadly, as a means of investigating the ways in which the current round of capitalist globalisation has entailed a territorial reorganisation of the urbanisation process simultaneously on global, national and urban-regional scales (see also Krätke, 1995).

Insofar as world city theory concerns the “contradictory relations between production in an era of global management and the political determination of territorial interests” (Friedmann, 1986, p. 69), it is centrally focused on the problematic of geographical scale, its politico-economic organisation and its role in the articulation of socio-political conflicts. Yet in practice this methodological challenge of analysing the changing historical linkages between differential spatial scales has not been systematically confronted. Much of world cities research has been composed of studies that focus largely upon a single scale, generally either the urban or the global. Whereas research on the socioeconomic geography of world cities has focused predominantly on the urban scale, studies of changing urban hierarchies have focused largely on the global scale. The scales of state territorial power have been neglected almost entirely by world cities researchers (Brenner, 1998a) and efforts to integrate differential spatial scales within a single analytical framework are still relatively rare within the parameters of world city theory. Nevertheless I suggest that world city theory contains various methodological insights that may be readily deployed to this end.

Perhaps more systematically than any other world cities researcher, Sassen (1991, 1993) has emphasised the inherent place-dependency of the globalisation process. World cities are conceived as the territorially specific urban places within which various production processes that are crucial to globalisation occur, above all those associated with the producer and financial services industries upon which transnational capital is heavily dependent—for example, banking, accounting, advertising, financial and management consulting, business law, insurance and the like. From the point of view of the present discussion, Sassen’s analysis can be viewed as an empirical application of Harvey’s theorisation of capital’s spatio-temporal dynamics. The consolidation of global cities is understood as an historically specific form of urban-industrial agglomeration that has played a crucial enabling role in the most recent round of globalisation. On the one hand, lower transport costs, increasingly flexible, decentralised modes of indus-
trial organisation and the development of new informational technologies have significantly enhanced capital’s ability to co-ordinate flows of value on a world scale. On the other hand, the strategies through which capital attempts at once to command and annihilate space are necessarily dependent upon investment in and control over the specific places within which the territorialised technological, institutional and social infrastructure of globalisation is secured. These places, Sassen argues, are the built environments, agglomeration economies, technological-institutional infrastructures and local labour markets of global cities. The consolidation of a worldwide hierarchy of competing yet interdependent world cities since the 1980s can thus be viewed as the territorial embodiment of this latest round of space–time compression.

A second, equally crucial, dimension of this reterritorialisation of the urbanisation process has been a major recomposition of urban form. Through their role in articulating local, regional, national and global economies, cities have today become massive, polycentric urban regions that are better described in terms of Jean Gottmann’s (1961) notion of megalopolis than through the lens of traditional Chicago School or central place models of concentric land-use patterns surrounding centralised metropolitan cores. The concept of the urban field, already deployed by both Lefebvre (1995/1968) and Friedmann (1973; Friedmann and Miller, 1965) three decades ago, was an early attempt to grasp this emergent multi-centred, patchwork pattern of supralocal urbanisation during the period of high Fordism. Sudjic (1993) has more recently described the massive, sprawling mosaics of post-Fordist urbanisation as ‘100-mile cities’. Relatedly, Soja (1992) has coined the suggestive term ‘exopolis’ to capture the transformed geometrical patterns of urbanisation that have crystallised in the technopoles of southern California. The exopolis, according to Soja (1992, p. 95), is not simply a city without a centre, but a city turned “inside-out” and “outside-in” at the same time”. However, it might be labelled, some version of this reconfiguration of urban form appears to be occurring in city-regions as diverse as Los Angeles, Amsterdam/Randstad, Frankfurt/Rhein-Main, the Zürich region, Tokyo/Yokohama/Nagoya and Hong Kong/Guandong, among many others. As the scale of the urbanisation process encompasses progressively larger geographical arenas, urban systems articulate new, increasingly polycentric geometries that blur inherited models of urban centrality while simultaneously reconstituting the patterns of core–periphery polarisation through which capital asserts its power over space, territory and place (Keil, 1994).

Thirdly, and most crucially here, the reterritorialisation of transnational capital within major urban regions has been closely linked to a broader re-scaling of the urbanisation process on supraregional scales. Whereas the world urban hierarchy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries corresponded roughly to the geopolitical hierarchy of states, today the geoeconomic power of cities has been increasingly disarticulated from the territorial matrices of the interstate system (Scott, 1998; Taylor, 1995). It is today widely acknowledged that contemporary cities are embedded in transnational flows of capital, commodities and labour-power—in Friedmann’s (1995, p. 25) phrase, a “space of global accumulation”—that no state can fully control, and that capital valorisation within global cities does not necessarily translate into national economic growth. Cities are therefore no longer to be conceived as the sub-national components of self-enclosed, autocentric and nationally scaled regimes of accumulation, but rather as ‘neo-Marshalian nodes within global networks’ (Amin and Thrift, 1992), as the ‘regional motors of the global economy’ (Scott, 1996), and as flexibly specialised locational clusters within a ‘global mosaic of regions’ (Storper and Scott, 1995). Under these circumstances, as peripheralised industrial regions compete with urban cores for capital investment, state subsidies and other collective goods, intensified forms of uneven geographical development are emerging (see, for example,
Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Peck and Tickell, 1994, 1995; Smith, 1997). These considerations suggest that contemporary urban regions must be conceived as pre-eminently ‘glocal’ spaces in which multiple geographical scales intersect in potentially highly conflictual ways. Here the local is embedded within and superimposed upon the global, while global processes simultaneously appear to permeate all aspects of the local (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Prigge, 1995). As Veltz (1997, p. 84) has recently noted:

The time is over when it was possible to show, as Braudel did, an economic world organized into clear-cut layers, where big urban centres linked, by themselves, adjacent ‘slow’ economies with the much more rapid rhythm of large-scale trade and finance. Today, everything occurs as if these superimposed layers were mixed and interpenetrated in (almost) all places. Short- and long-range interdependencies can no longer be separated from one another.

The boundary separating spatial scales is thus becoming so blurred that it may be increasingly appropriate to conceive the scalar organisation of contemporary capitalism as a continuum of glocalised interaction—as a “hierarchical stratified morphology”, in Lefebvre’s terminology (see, for example, Lefebvre 1976, pp. 67–69)—in and through which capital’s latest round of reterritorialisation is unfolding.

6. Re-scaling States

This ongoing re-scaling of urbanisation has been analysed in detail in contemporary urban studies, but concomitant processes of state re-scaling have received far less attention. In particular, much urban research on globalisation has been based upon a zero-sum conception of state power in relation to the world economy: the state is said to decline in power and significance as globalisation intensifies. As a result, like many other globalisation researchers (see, for example, Albrow, 1996; Appadurai 1996; Ohmae, 1995; Ruggie, 1993; Strange, 1996), urbanists have frequently assumed that intensified economic globalisation is leading to an erosion of state territoriality. According to this globalist position, capital’s purportedly greater geographical mobility and increasing scales of operation weaken irreversibly the state’s ability to regulate economic activities within its boundaries. On the other hand, among those authors who emphasise the continued importance of state institutions in the current configuration of world capitalism (see, for example, Hirst and Thompson, 1995; Mann, 1997), territoriality is frequently understood as a relatively static and unchanging geographical container that is not qualitatively modified by the globalisation process. From this point of view, the state is said to react to intensified global economic interdependence by constructing new forms of national socioeconomic policy, but is not itself transformed qualitatively through these new global–national interactions. These statist positions reify state territoriality into an unhistorical framework for socioeconomic intervention that is not fundamentally transformed through its role in processes of global capitalist restructuring. They thereby produce a misleading sense of ‘business as usual’ in the world economy in which nationally scaled state institutions retain sovereign regulatory control over national economic systems.

In contrast to both of these positions, I propose that the state’s role as a form of (re)territorialisation for capital is analytically distinct from the structural significance of the national spatial scale in circumscribing capital flows, economic transactions, urban hierarchies and social relations. From this point of view, the globalists are indeed correct to emphasise the ongoing decentralising of the national scale of political-economic regulation, but they err in interpreting this development as evidence for a contraction, retreat or dissolution of state territoriality. Meanwhile, the statist are likewise correct to emphasise the continued importance of state territoriality, but err in assuming that this role remains tied
inextricably to *nationally* scaled state institutions and policies. In my view, both arguments fail to appreciate various ongoing transformations of state territorial organisation through which: qualitatively new institutions and regulatory forms are currently being produced on both sub- and supranational scales; and, the role of the national scale as a level of governance is itself being radically redefined in response to the current round of capitalist globalisation. This re-scaling of state territorial organisation must be viewed as a constitutive, enabling moment of the globalisation process.

Though the highly centralised, bureaucratised states of the Fordist-Keynesian era converged around the national scale as their predominant organisational locus, since the world economic crises of the early 1970s the older industrial states of North America and western Europe have been restructured substantially to provide capital with ever more of its essential territorial preconditions and collective goods on both sub- and supranational spatial scales (Cerny, 1995). This ongoing re-scaling of territoriality is simultaneously transferring state power upwards to supranational agencies such as the European Union (EU) and devolving it downwards towards the state’s regional and local levels, which are better positioned to promote and regulate urban-regional restructuring. As Jessop (1994, p. 264) argues:

The national state is now subject to various changes which result in its ‘hollowing out’. This involves two contradictory trends, for, while the national state still remains politically important and even retains much of its national sovereignty [...] its capacities to project its power even within its national borders are decisively weakened ... by the shift towards internationalized, flexible (but also regionalized) production systems [...] This loss of autonomy creates in turn both the need for supranational coordination and the space for subnational resurgence. Some state capacities are transferred to a growing number of pan-regional, plurinational, or international bodies with a widening range of powers; others are devolved to restructured local or regional levels of governance in the national state; and yet others are being usurped by emerging horizontal networks of power—local and regional— which by-pass central states and connect localities or regions in several nations.

Throughout the EU and North America, in particular, this dynamic of state re-scaling has emerged as a major neo-liberal strategy of industrial restructuring and crisis management, aiming at once to enhance the administrative efficiency of state institutions, to enable new forms of capital mobility on supranational to promote the global competitiveness of major sub-national growth poles and to enforce the de- and revalorisation of capital within declining cities and regions. Much like the place-based infrastructures of global cities, these newly emergent, re-scaled state institutions can be viewed as crucial forms of reterritorialisation for capital. As noted above, rather than abandon the concept of urbanisation in the face of emergent, polycentric forms of ‘global sprawl’ (Keil, 1994), world cities researchers have proposed revised geometrical models of urban growth, urban form and urban hierarchy. A formally identical methodological strategy can be deployed to characterise the re-configured spatial form of territorial states in the current era. If the spatial form of world city-regions today increasingly approaches that of the ‘exopolis’ analysed by Soja (1992), it can be argued analogously that the spatial form of territorial states in the age of global capitalism is being ‘glocalised’ (see also Swyngedouw, 1997). Like the exopolis, the urban expression of post-Fordist forms of capitalist industrialisation, the ‘glocal state’ is a polymorphic geometrical configuration that is likewise being turned simultaneously inside-out and outside-in—*inside out* insofar as it attempts to promote the global competitiveness of its cities and regions; and *outside in* insofar as supranational agencies such as the EU, the IMF and the World Bank have come to play ever more direct roles in the
regulation and restructuring of its internal territorial spaces. This ongoing ‘glocalisation’ of the state is rearticulating inherited political geographies in ways that are systematically deprivileging nationally organised institutional arrangements and regulatory forms. Thus understood, state territoriality currently retains a critical role as a geographical precondition for contemporary forms of capital accumulation, but this role is no longer premised upon an isomorphic territorial correspondence between state institutions, urban systems and circuits of capital accumulation centred around the national scale.

Cerny (1995, p. 618) has vividly referred to this simultaneous fragmentation and redifferentiation of political space as a ‘whipsaw effect’ through which each level of the state attempts to react to a nearly overwhelming variety of sub- and supranational pressures, forces and constraints. In the present context, one particularly crucial geographical consequence of this ‘whipsaw effect’ has been the intensified mobilisation of central, regional and local state institutions to promote industrial restructuring on the sub-national scales of major urban-regional agglomerations. On the one hand, state re-scaling can be viewed as a neoliberal strategy of ‘deregulation’ to dismantle the nationally configured redistributive operations of the Fordist-Keynesian order, frequently by undermining the social-welfare functions of municipal institutions. On the other hand, just as crucially, state re-scaling has served as a strategy of ‘reregulation’ to construct new institutional capacities for promoting capital investment within major urban growth poles, often through locally or regionally organised welfare policies, non-elected quangos and other entrepreneurial initiatives such as public–private partnerships. Under these circumstances, the role of the local and regional levels of the state is being significantly redefined. Contemporary local and regional states no longer operate as the managerial agents of nationally scaled collective consumption programmes but serve as entrepreneurial agencies of ‘state-financed capital’ oriented towards maintaining and enhancing the locational advantages of their delineated territorial jurisdictions (Gottdiener, 1990; Mayer, 1994). Indeed, it is above all through their key role in the mobilisation of urban space as a force of production that local and regional states, in particular, have acquired an increasing structural significance within each territorial state’s administrative hierarchy. A major goal of these ‘glocally’ oriented state institutions is to enhance the locational advantages and productive capacities of their territorial jurisdictions as maximally competitive nodes in the world economy.

Throughout western Europe, this increasing internal fragmentation, redifferentiation and polarisation of erstwhile national economic spaces has been further intensified since the early 1980s through: the deployment of new forms of regional structural policy oriented towards the ‘endogenous’ development of major urban regions (Albrechts and Swyngedouw, 1989; Heeg, 1996); and, the construction of new forms and levels of state territorial organisation, notably on urban-regional or metropolitan scales (Evans and Harding, 1997; Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1993; Voelzkow, 1996). In major urban regions throughout the EU, regionally scaled regulatory institutions are being planned, promoted and constructed as a means to secure place-specific locational advantages against. These new state spaces for the regulation of urban growth are being justified not as components of national socioeconomic programmes or as functional units within nationally hierarchised administrative systems, but rather as place-specific institutional prerequisites for maintaining the global structural competitiveness of a given urban region. One major consequence of this emergent pattern of sub-national locational politics has been a massive intensification of uneven geographical development as isolated temporal ‘bursts’ of growth are promoted by state institutions within carefully delineated geographical sites.

In this sense, then, the current round of neoliberal globalisation is re-scaling state territoriality rather than eroding it: the denation-
alisation of the national economy and urban hierarchies is not undermining the state’s role as a form of territorialisation of capital, but ‘denationalising’ its scalar structure to privilege supra- and sub-national levels of regulatory intervention and capital valorisation. The resultant ‘glocalisation’ regulatory institutions are reterritorialising state power onto multiple spatial scales that do not converge with one another on the national scale or constitute an isomorphic, self-enclosed national totality (Anderson, 1996; Cerny, 1995). However, just as world city-regions remain urban agglomerations, the post-Fordist, post-Keynesian states that have been consolidated throughout the older industrialised world since the early 1980s likewise remain territorial states in significant ways. Insofar as the scales of state territorial organisation continue to circumscribe social, economic and political relations within delineated geographical boundaries, state institutions have maintained their essentially territorial character. The crucial point in the present context is that state territoriality is today increasingly being configured in ‘glocalised’ rather than in nationalised scalar frameworks.

As early as the mid 1970s, Henri Lefebvre had begun to outline some of the broad contours of this newly emergent, re-scaled form of state territorial power in which “the economy and politics [are] fused” (Lefebvre, 1977, 1986, p. 35), and its implications for the state’s relation to its territorial space. As Lefebvre notes in the concluding chapter of The Production of Space (1991/1974, p. 378):

That relationship [between the state and space] [...] is becoming tighter: the spatial role of the state [...] is more patent. Administrative and political state apparatuses are no longer content (if they ever were) merely to intervene in an abstract manner in the investment of capital [...] Today the state and its bureaucratic and political apparatuses intervene continually in space, and make use of space in its instrumental aspect in order to intervene at all levels and through every agency of the economic realm.

This tendency towards a fusion of state institutions into the circuit of capital is crucially enabled through strategies of state re-scaling, which in turn translate into reconfigured forms of local–regional regulation that enable capital to extract and valorise the surplus. The resultant, re-scaled configurations of state territorial power are tightly intertwined with capital on differential spatial scales, and therefore, increasingly sensitive to the rhythms and contradictions of each circuit of capital (see also Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 166–179). As the state comes to operate as an increasingly active moment in the mobilisation of each territory’s productive forces, its scalar organisation in turn assumes a central role in mediating and circumscribing capitalist growth.

7. New State Spaces: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the EU

The implementation of both urban re-scaling and state re-scaling is a highly contested, conflictual process, mediated through a wide range of socio-political struggles for hegemonic control over social space that are in turn articulated upon multiple spatial scales. On the one hand, as argued above, urban re-scaling and state re-scaling can be understood as two distinctive forms of reterritorialisation that have emerged in conjunction with the most recent round of crisis-induced capitalist globalisation (as summarised in Table 1). On the other hand, processes of urban-regional restructuring and state territorial restructuring are closely intertwined insofar as each form of reterritorialisation continually influences and transforms the conditions under which the other unfolds. First, the processes of urban-regional restructuring induced by the global economic crises of the early 1970s have provided much of the impetus for neo-liberal strategies of state re-scaling. State re-scaling has operated as a major strategy of neoliberal crisis management and state-organised capital revalorisa-
Table 1. Globalisation as reterritorialisation: re-scaling cities and states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of (re)territorialisation</th>
<th>Spatial scale of capital accumulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban re-scaling</td>
<td>Formation of a world urban hierarchy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World city formation</td>
<td>Intensified interspatial competition among cities throughout the world economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>States</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State territorial restructuring</td>
<td>Territorial states turned ‘outside-in’: re-scaled upwards towards supra-national levels of regulation as institutions such as the EU, the IMF and the World Bank restructure state space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence of neoliberal ‘glocal states’</td>
<td>‘Denationalisation’ of the national scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central state transfers various tasks upwards towards supra-national agencies and devolves others downwards towards regional and local state institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a wide range of urban-regional contexts, from declining Fordist manufacturing regions to new industrial districts and global city-regions. State re-scaling can thus be viewed as a crucial accumulation strategy that is currently being deployed by neoliberal political regimes throughout Europe to restructure urban and regional spaces. Secondly, processes of state re-scaling have in turn significantly reconfigured the relationship between capital, state institutions and territorially circumscribed socio-political forces within major European urban regions. Whereas capital constantly strives to enhance its spatial mobility by diminishing its place-dependency, contemporary ‘glocal’ states are attempting ever more directly to fix capital within their territories through the provision of immobile, place-specific assets and externalities that either cannot be found elsewhere or cannot be abandoned without considerable devalorisation costs. In this manner, through processes of state re-scaling, the scales of state territorial organisation have become central mediators of capitalist industrial restructuring. It can be argued, therefore, that the governance of contemporary urbanisation patterns entails not only the construction of ‘new industrial spaces’ for post-Fordist forms of industrialisation (Scott, 1988b) but, just as crucially, the consolidation of what might be termed new state spaces to enhance each state’s capacity to mobilise urban and regional space as a productive force.

Insofar as today neither urbanisation, accumulation nor state regulation privilege a single, self-enclosed and circumscribed spatial scale, the geographical boundaries of social relations have become direct objects of socio-political contestation. Thus emerges a ‘politics of scale’ (Smith, 1993, 1995) in which geographical scales come to operate simultaneously as sites and stakes of socio-
political struggle. However, many contemporary discussions of urban governance have presupposed a relatively fixed urban or regional jurisdic- tional framework within which the regulatory preconditions for capitalist urbanisation are secured (for a recent overview, see Hall and Hubbard, 1996). In this sense, the scales of urban governance have been viewed as the preconstituted platforms for urban politics rather than as one of their active, socially produced moments, dimensions or objects. By contrast, the preceding analysis indicates that new geographies of urban governance are currently crystallising at the multi-scalar interface between processes of urban restructuring and state territorial restructuring. The contemporary dilemmas and contradictions of urban governance must thus be analysed on each of the spatial scales on which these intertwined processes of reterritorialisation intersect, from the urban-regional to the national and European scales. Though it is not possible in the present context to elaborate a detailed analysis of each of these scales and their complex interconnections, some of the major socio-institutional mechanisms linking processes of urban-regional restructuring and processes of state re-scaling in the contemporary EU can be briefly identified.

World Cities and the Geopolitics of European Integration

The locations of world cities have played a major role in the competition among European states to acquire EU government offices within their territories. This form of interspatial competition is mediated directly through world cities’ host states as they negotiate the terms and pace of European integration. Such locational decisions have resulted in part from strategic compromises among Europe’s hegemonic powers, as illustrated in the choice of Brussels as the EU’s administrative headquarters. However, the recent decision to locate the European Central Bank in Frankfurt was a major turning-point in the geopolitical and geo-economic struggle between the UK and Germany to pull Europe’s locational centre of gravity towards their respective territories (London received only a meagre consolation prize, the European Patent Office). The process of European monetary integration also has potentially major implications for patterns of interspatial competition among European financial centres. London currently remains the most important centre of financial services within the EU. However, the introduction of the euro may provide new opportunities to Frankfurt and Paris, which are currently developing new regulatory and technological infrastructures for global financial markets, and whose host states are immediately participating in the single currency (see The Economist, 9 May 1998, Financial Centres Survey, p. 17). For this reason, the re-scaling of European territorial states upwards towards the EU may favour the eventual formation of an integrated Frankfurt–Paris–London axis articulating the European super-region with the world economy (Taylor, 1997).

World Cities and Intergovernmental Relations

Since the early 1980s, central–local relations have been radically transformed throughout western Europe. Insofar as states conceive their territorial sub-units as functionally equivalent administrative tiers rather than as geographically distinctive nodes of urbanisation, processes of world city formation are rarely discussed in central state policy debates on intergovernmental relations (the debate on ‘city provinces’ in the Netherlands since the early 1990s is a significant recent exception). Nevertheless, reconfigurations of intergovernmental relations can have significant ramifications for the governance of major urban regions to the extent that they rearrange the local state’s administrative, organisational and financial links to the central state, and thereby affect its capacity to mobilise regulatory resources (K. Cox, 1990). At one extreme, the Thatcherite wave of central–local restructuring in the UK entailed the consolidation of a neo-authoritarian form
of centrally imposed governance in the London region (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988). At the other extreme, state restructuring in the FRG since the early 1980s has entailed an increasingly decentralised role for both the Länder and the municipalities in the formulation and implementation of industrial policy (Herrigel, 1996). Between these poles, in the Netherlands debates on central–local restructuring have proliferated on all levels of the Dutch state since the mid 1980s, leading the central state, the provinces and the municipalities to converge upon the goal of world city formation in the western Randstad megalopolis as a shared priority for national socioeconomic policy (Dieleman and Musterd, 1992). The nature of urban governance within world city-regions is therefore conditioned strongly by patterns of intergovernmental relations within their host states. As the local state’s linkages to the regional and central levels of the state are reconfigured, so too are its institutional and financial capacities to regulate the urban contradictions of globalisation.

World Cities and Territorial Politics

The dynamics of local growth coalitions have been analysed in detail by urban regime theorists (Logan and Molotch, 1987). However, the articulation of municipal political dynamics within world cities with broader regional and national political constellations has not been extensively investigated (but see Logan and Swanstrom, 1990). However, as Friedmann and Wolff (1982, p. 312) point out,

Being essential to both transnational capital and national political interests, world cities may become bargaining counters in the ensuing struggles

The crucial question, from this perspective, is how the economic disjuncture between the world city and the territorial economy of its host state is managed politically. The UK is undoubtedly the most dramatic European instance of this disjuncture and an associated, highly polarised territorial politics. Since the mid 1970s, the dynamism of England’s South East as a global city-region has been based predominantly on an offshore economy, derived from the City’s role as a global financial centre, largely delinked from the declining cities and regions located elsewhere within the UK. The rise of Thatcherism in the 1980s can be interpreted as a “declaration of independence by the south of England, the community dependent on London as a world city” (Taylor, 1995, p. 59). However, even in the Netherlands, where the Amsterdam/Randstad region is widely viewed as the urban engine of the national economy, the mobilisation of central and local policies around the goal of world city formation during the late 1980s entailed the construction of a ‘national urban growth coalition’ to convert central cities from providers of welfare state services into the new ‘spearheads’ of economic growth (Terhorst and van de Ven, 1995). Throughout the EU, the political-economic geography of world cities extends beyond the jurisdictional reach of the local state to reconfigure political-territorial alliances on multiple scale-levels of their host states. Therefore, just as the territorial structure of the state conditions the politics of scale within world cities, so too is the re-scaling of urbanisation processes intertwined with a re-scaling of politics and political contestation within the territorial state.

Urban Regions and Spatial Planning Systems

As noted earlier, new geographies of state spatial policy are emerging throughout the EU that are oriented towards the ‘endogenous’ potentials of delineated sub-national territories such as urban regions, which are now increasingly viewed as the geographical foundations of national industrial performance. For instance, in contemporary Germany, the Spatial Planning Law (Raumordnungsgesetz) has recently been radically redefined to abandon the traditional post-war project of ‘equalising life conditions’ on a national scale in favour of the promotion of urban regions as the most
GLOBALISATION AS RETERRITORIALISATION

essential ‘level of policy implementation’ (Brenner, 1997b). Likewise, in the Netherlands, the post-war project of ‘deconcentration’, which attempted to spread urbanisation beyond the western agglomeration of the Randstad, has been radically reversed since the late 1980s under a new ‘compact cities’ policy. The revised national frameworks for Dutch spatial planning introduced in the 1990s have likewise actively promoted the recentralisation of industrial growth within the western urban cores (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and the Hague) and unambiguously specified the Randstad megalopolis as the urban-regional engine of national economic growth (Faludi and van der Valk, 1994). Closely analogous reorientations of nationally organised spatial planning systems are occurring throughout the EU (Albrechts and Swyngedouw, 1989). Meanwhile, on the EU level itself, the classical goal of mediating core–periphery polarisation through regional structural policies is likewise being redefined to promote ‘endogenous’ potentials for regional economic development throughout European territorial space (Tömmel, 1996). This trend is likely to intensify as the structural funds programme is redefined in conjunction with EU enlargement. As these examples make clear, nationally organised state spaces throughout the EU are currently being rehierarchised and redifferentiated into a highly uneven mosaic of relatively distinctive urban-regional economic spaces, each defined according to its specific position within supranational divisions of labour.

Urban Regions and Metropolitan Governance

In the midst of these supra-urban re-scalings, the problem of constructing relatively fixed configurations of territorial organisation on urban-regional scales has remained as urgent as ever. The political-regulatory institutions of urban regions are often fragmented into multiple agencies and departments with distinct jurisdictions and tasks. Yet the process of economic globalisation is creating denser socioeconomic interdependencies on urban-regional scales that generally supersede the reach of each of these administrative levels. Problems of metropolitan governance are therefore returning to the forefront of political discussion and debate in many European cities. Whereas debates on metropolitan institutions during the 1960s and 1970s focused predominantly on the issues of administrative efficiency and local service provision, contemporary discussions of regional governance increasingly emphasise the need for administrative flexibility, regionally co-ordinated economic development strategies and the problem of intensified global interspatial competition. In this context, regional forms of regulation are being justified as crucial prerequisites for maintaining a city’s locational advantages in the world economy. Throughout Europe, from London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, Lyon and Paris to the Ruhr agglomeration, Hannover, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Zürich, Bologna and Milan, urban economic policy is being linked ever more directly to diverse forms of spatial planning, investment and regulation on regional scales (see Lefèvre 1998; Wentz, 1994). These newly emergent forms of regional cooperation within major urban regions are grounded upon a distinctively post-Fordist variant of ‘solidarity’ that entails an economic logic of maximising the competitiveness of a territorially delimited space of capitalist production rather than a social logic of redistributing its economic surplus across the social space of a single coherent ‘society’ (Ronneberger, 1997). On the other hand, this globally induced concern to establish regional forms of regulation is frequently challenged through pressures from below in defence of local autonomy, place- and scale-specific vested interests and the continued jurisdictional fragmentation of the local state (Ronneberger and Schmid, 1995). Under these conditions, state territorial organisation becomes at once the arena and the object of socio-political struggle at the local and regional scales. As these opposed perspectives on regional regulation clash within contemporary urban regions, what ensues is a
struggle for regulatory control over the urbanisation process mediated through socio-political contestation over the scale(s) of governance. As urban regions throughout Europe compete with one another for locational advantages in the global and European urban hierarchies, the scales of urban and regional territorial organisation are becoming ever more crucial at once as regulatory instruments of the state and as sites of socio-political conflict.

The Territorial Organisation of World Cities

It is ultimately on the urban scale, however, that the productive capacities of territorial organisation are mobilised. Today, municipal governments throughout Europe are directly embracing this goal through a wide range of supply-side strategies that entail the demarcation, construction and promotion of strategic urban places for industrial development— for example, office centres, industrial parks, telematics networks, transport and shipping terminals and various types of retail, entertainment and cultural facilities. These emergent forms of ‘urban entrepreneualism’ have been analysed extensively with reference to the crucial role of public–private partnerships in facilitating capital investment in mega-projects situated in strategically designated locations of the city (Gottdiener, 1990; Harvey, 1989c; Mayer, 1994). The Docklands in London is perhaps the most spectacular European instance of this type of massive state investment in the urban infrastructure of global capital, but it exemplifies a broader strategic shift in urban policy that can be observed in cities throughout the world. As Harvey (1989c, pp. 7–8) indicates, such state-financed mega-projects are designed primarily to enhance the productive capacity of urban places within global flows of value, rather than to reorganise living and working conditions more broadly within cities. At the same time, however, the locational capacities of these urban places necessarily depend upon a relatively fixed infrastructure of territorial organisation through which value can be extracted and valorised at globally competitive turnover times. Throughout Europe, this link between processes of urban re-scaling and state re-scaling is embodied institutionally in the key role of various newly created para-state agencies in planning and co-ordinating investment within these local mega-projects (for example, the London Docklands Development Corporation, Frankfurt’s Rhein-Main Economic Development Corporation, the Schiphol Airport Development Corporation; and many others).

This broad overview has only begun to examine the intricacies of the various geographical scales on which these struggles over the territorial organisation of urban governance are occurring in contemporary Europe and their complex, rapidly changing interconnections. The scales of state territorial power are both the medium and the outcome of this dizzying, multi-scalar dialectic of ‘glocal’ transformation that is today far from over. Conflicts that erupt over the territorial organisation of the state on each of these scales are, of course, also conditioned by the territorial-organisational configuration of the other scales upon which they are superimposed. At the same time, these circumscribed socio-political conflicts can become highly volatile, ‘jumping scales’ (Smith, 1993) to influence, restructure or even transform the organisational structure of the broader scale-configurations in which they are enmeshed.

It is in this sense that the currently unfolding denationalisation of urbanisation, accumulation and state territorial power has opened up a space for scales themselves to become direct objects of socio-political struggle. Under these circumstances, scales do not merely circumscribe social relations within determinate geographical boundaries, but constitute an active, socially produced and politically contested moment of those relations. As densely organised forcefields in which transnational capital, territorial states and localised social relations intersect, world cities are geographical sites in which the socio-political stakes of this politics of scale are particularly substantial in both geo-
political and geoeconomic terms. The central analytical and political conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that problems of urban governance can no longer be confronted merely on an urban scale, as dilemmas of municipal or even regional regulation, but must be analysed as well on the national, supranational and global scales of state territorial power—for it is ultimately on these supra-urban scales that the intensely contradictory political geography of neoliberalism is configured.

8. Conclusion: Scaling Politics, Politicising Scales

Currently unfolding re-scalings of urbanisation and state territorial power have entailed a major transformation in the geographical organisation of world capitalism. The spatial scales of capitalist production, urbanisation and state regulation are today being radically reorganised, so dramatically that inherited geographical vocabularies for describing the nested hierarchy of scales that interface world capitalism no longer provide adequate analytical tools for conceptualising the multi-layered, densely interwoven and highly contradictory character of contemporary spatial practices. Faced with capital’s increasingly ‘glocal’ spatio-temporal dynamics, the territorial infrastructures of urbanisation and state regulation no longer coalesce around the national scale-level. Whereas cities today operate increasingly as urban nodes within a world urban hierarchy, states are rapidly restructuring themselves to enhance the global competitiveness of their major cities and regions.

Because urban regions occupy the highly contradictory interface between the world economy and the territorial state, they are embedded within a multiplicity of social, economic and political processes organised upon superimposed spatial scales. The resultant politics of scale within the political-regulatory institutions of major urban regions can be construed as a sequence of groping, trial-and-error strategies to manage these intensely conflictual forces through the continual construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of relatively stabilised configurations of territorial organisation. The re-scaling of urbanisation leads to a concomitant re-scaling of the state through which, simultaneously, territorial organisation is mobilised as a productive force and social relations are circumscribed within determinate geographical boundaries. These re-scaled configurations of state territorial organisation in turn transform the conditions under which the urbanisation process unfolds. However, whether these disjointed strategies of reterritorialisation within European cities might establish new spatial fixes for sustained capital accumulation in the global-local disorder of the late 20th century is a matter that can only be resolved through the politics of scale itself, through the ongoing struggle for hegemonic control over place, territory and space.

Henri Lefebvre (1995/1968, 1991/1974, 1978) has argued at length that struggles over the territorial organisation of the urbanisation process express the dual character of spatial scales under capitalism—i.e. their role at once as framings for everyday social relations and as productive forces for successive rounds of world-scale capital accumulation. Therefore, each scale on which the urbanisation process unfolds simultaneously bounds social relations within determinate geographical arenas, hierarchises places and territories within broader configurations of uneven geographical development and mediates capital’s incessant struggle to expand its command and control over the abstract space of the world economy. The emergent politics of scale regarding urban governance within contemporary urban regions presents yet another dimension of territorial organisation under capitalism to which Lefebvre also devoted considerable attention—its role as a realm of potentially transformative political praxis in which ‘counter plans’, ‘counter-projects’ and ‘counter-spaces’ might be constructed (Lefebvre, 1978, pp. 413–444; 1991/1974, pp. 383–384). The territorial organisation of urban governance within contemporary cities is thus a major battleground.
on which each of these intertwined dimensions of spatial practices is superimposed. Today, there is an urgent need for new conceptualisations of scale to obtain an analytical—and political—fix on current processes of reterritorialisation and their implications for the geographical organisation of social relations in an era of neoliberal globalisation.

Notes

1. Although much of Lefebvre’s state theory focuses upon the state’s role as a form of territorialisation for capital, he also devotes extensive attention to ways in which the state operates as the most crucial institutional mediator of capital’s uneven geographical development. The state’s mediation of uneven geographical development always occurs through historically specific regulatory strategies and institutional forms that often stand in sharp tension with those oriented towards the territorialisation of capital. On Lefebvre’s state theory, see Brenner, 1997a, 1998b.

2. With Mann (1988, 1993), I view the essential attribute of the modern territorial state as its territorially centralised form, in contradistinction to all other power actors in the capitalist world system (capitalist firms, civic associations, NGOs, etc.). This definition leads to an analysis of contemporary processes of globalisation as being superimposed and overlaid upon the global grid of state territorialities rather than signalling a unilinear erosion of territoriality as such. By contrast, many authors who define the state in terms of the isomorphic link between territory and sovereignty; as a self-enclosed container of economic, political and/or cultural processes; or as a locus of community and collective identity interpret contemporary transformations as a process of state decline (see, for example, Appadurai, 1996; Cerny, 1995; Ruggie, 1993).

3. After over a decade of central state control over London, the Confederation of British Industry has advocated the construction of a London Development Agency responsible for planning urban growth throughout the South East; meanwhile, a London municipal council has recently been approved by local referendum. In the Frankfurt/Rhein-Main region, various political and economic factions have recently advocated a new, streamlined model of regional governance under the rubric of a ‘Rhein-Main Regional County’, which would bundle the region’s administrative organisation and productive capacities within a single regulatory armature of the state. Even in the Randstad region of the Netherlands, where central state proposals to construct new, regionally organised ‘city-provinces’ were overwhelmingly rejected in local referenda held in 1995 in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, new forms of informal institutional co-ordination are nevertheless currently being developed throughout the Randstad to regulate and promote urban growth on regional scales.

References


BRENNER, N. (1998a) Global cities, glocal states: global city formation and state territorial re-
structuring in contemporary Europe, Review of International Political Economy, 5, pp. 1–37.


RUGGIE, J. G. (1993) Territoriality and beyond: problematising modernity in international rela-